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I. Abstract:  
 
In a climate of globalized politics and neoliberal economics, it can be difficult to isolate 
the impacts of agricultural and economic policy on the lives of the rural poor in India. Hidden 
behind a veil of economic growth, pro urban, and pro industry governments, the stories of small 
and marginal farmers have been overlooked in the name of different development priorities.  
This study endeavors to put the agrarian poor back into the scholarship spotlight by 
deconstructing livelihood crises and farmer debt in Sulthanpur Village, Andhra Pradesh. This 
effort is important because although Andhra Pradesh has the highest rate of farmer indebtedness 
in India, few village level analyses have been preformed.  
Through a combination of formal interviewing, direct observation, and case studies, this 
study found that farmer debt in Sulthanpur can be traced to two phenomena– a crisis of 
productivity and a crisis of profitability – which are both intimately connected by issues of water 
scarcity and irrigation investment and simultaneously framed by issues of globalization and 
agricultural policy. This paper will analyze these two crises in depth as it seeks to understand the 
role that the search for water, especially through personal investment in borewells, plays in 
creating perpetual and outstanding debt for farmers. In doing so, this paper will also explore a 
other contributing factors, including a local widespread shift toward cash crop, linear, input 
intensive agriculture, the role of informal finance in the local economy, and increasing 
expenditures for farmers. In discovering the extent of the debt burden in Sulthanur, this study 
concludes by calling for a partnership between scholarship and activism as a necessary 



























II. Introduction  
 
 
In a climate of globalized politics and neoliberal economics, it can be difficult to isolate 
the impacts of agricultural and economic policy on the lives of the rural poor in India. Hidden 
behind a veil of economic growth, pro urban, and pro industry governments, their stories can fall 
through the cracks, especially if they lack the drama of a large social movement or single 
unifying horror. This disconnect between policy and people, between centers of power and the 
rest of the country, marginalizes the stories of over 70% of India’s population who live in rural 
areas and depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods.
1
 The paradox is that the stories of these 
farmers can reveal more about the impacts and appropriateness of agricultural development 
policy than any measurement of growth possibly could.   
 
A. Agrarian Distress: The Indian Context 
Countless scholars, officials, and citizens agree that there is currently an agricultural and 
agrarian crisis occurring in India. The former, which is primarily the concern of growth focused 
Indian governments and international financial institutions, is manifested through declining 
agricultural productivity across the country and a declining share of agriculture in the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product  (GDP).  
While these statistics are important indicators of change, they do not provide the entire 
picture. The concept of Agrarian crisis, however, in its consideration of people, economics, and 
the environment, and prioritization of livelihood issues, provides a more holistic understanding 
of rural and angricultural realities in India. 
2
 Instead of reducing agricultural change to growth 
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statistics, the agrarian lens reveals stories of distress induced farmer migration, debt, and even 
suicide throughout the country. In description of this perspective, R. Radhakrishna, author and 
scholar, states: “Agrarian crisis is eroding the economic and social foundation of rural India and 




B. Agrarian Distress: The Andhra Pradesh Context 
 
As mentioned previously, out of the five states experiencing high indicators of Agrarian 
distress, including Maharashtra, Punjab, Kerala, and Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh ranks highest in 
measurements of farmer debt and farmer suicide. In Andhra Pradesh, over 80% of farmers are 
living in debt and since 1997, the state has experienced over 200,000 farmer suicides.  
Scholarship and media coverage of this issue has largely limited their scope to that of 
farmer suicide. While these heartbreaking stories do provide a window into the severity of 
agrarian crisis, scholars can write obituary upon obituary without ever confronting structural, 
institutional, and root causes of agrarian distress. As V.M. Rao says in his essay, “Farmers’ 
Distress in a Modernizing Agriculture,”  “Farmers’ distress…is the huge iceberg hiding below 
the visible tip of suicides.”
4
 In an attempt to share the bulk of stories that have been fairly 
marginalized by the drama of suicide, this study chose to focus upon farmer distress as it relates 
to irrigation and debt in rural Andhra Pradesh. With help from the nonprofit, WASSAN 
(Watershed Activities and Services Network) which works on rural livelihood issues throughout 
Andhra Pradesh, Sulthanpur Village, in the Rangareddy District, was chosen as a site to analyze 
farmers debt burden as it relates to their investments, particularly in irrigation.  
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In Andhra Pradesh, rural landscapes have been dramatically restructured since the state 
liberalized its economy in 1991 and fully liberalized agricultural trade in 1997. New technologies 
and international agricultural companies flooded the Indian rural economy, bringing with them a 
host of hybrid seeds and new chemicals, and reorienting local agriculture toward a larger market. 
Currently, though 70% of farmers in Andhra Pradesh own less than two hectares of land, and 
over 90% of farmers in Sulthanpur own less than two acres of land, nearly all are engaged in 
input intensive, market oriented agriculture.
5
 Further, as changing policies and technologies have 
imposed a more expensive, market dependent system of production on small and marginal 
farmers and removed institutional and economic support systems, like minimum export prices, 
rural livelihoods have entered into a period of decline.  
This decline can be summarized by two phenomena: a crisis of productivity and a crisis 
of profitability in rural Andhra Pradesh wherein agricultural systems are failing to provide 





III. “A Village Level Analysis”: Studying Sulthanpur, Andhra Pradesh 
 
In Sulthanpur Village, Andhra Pradesh – the location of this study – the variable of water 
connects these two crises as water scarcity pushes farmers to take out loans to drill borewells and 
frequently creates a more severe debt crisis for small and marginal farmers. This paper an 
analysis of how this water, technology, debt nexus manifests itself in the lives of farmers in 
Sulthanpur Village, Andhra Pradesh as they experience declining productivity and profitability 
on their land and in the market. Drawing upon interviews with borewell farmers, rainfed farmers, 
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borewell operators and drilling company owners, money lenders and seed/chemical shop owners, 
local village organizations, and the state bank, in addition to a few more in depth case studies of 
farmers, this study explores how water demands and water scarcity, as it is seen through 
investment in borewell irrigation, connects productivity and profit crises as well as engages 
farmers into an even stronger cycle of borrowing and debt in Sulthanpur. What this study 
discovered is that in sulthanpur, farmer debt and distress can be traced to two phenomena – a 
crisis of productivity and a crisis of profitability – which are connected by issues of water 
scarcity and irrigation investment and framed by issues of globalization and changing 
agricultural systems 
While this is a geographically focused study, it also includes secondary research and 
discussion of the larger policy framework as it attempts to trace the impacts of agricultural and 
development policy in the state on the lives of farmers and farming families. While borewell 
irrigation and debt might be immediate causes of agrarian distress, they are rooted in a larger 
context of the globalization of agriculture and changing agricultural systems across India’s rural 
landscape, making a preliminary discussion of agricultural policy vital to understanding the 
situation in Sulthanpur.  
  
A. Scope and Methodology:   
Discussing agrarian crisis, Narasimha Reddy and Srijit Mishra maintain that 
“methodologically, analysis of the impact of structural and institutional changes requires 
household and village level studies with particular attention to the processes of change.”
7
 In this 
same vein, this study was tightly focused geographically so that it could provide a more holistic 
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analysis of changing livelihoods and the structural nature of farmer debt without introducing too 
many location dependent variables. Similarly, household level analysis was seen as the building 
blocks for a larger village level analysis as distress and debt is experienced and mediated by the 
entire family unit. As a result, efforts were made to speak with multiple members of the 
households interviewed in Sulthanpur.  
With the guidance of a local nongovernmental organization, Watershed Activities and 
Services Network (WASSAN), Sulthanpur village, located in the Ranga Reddy district of 
Andhra Pradesh, was chosen as the location for this study. Outside of the farmer suicide hotspots 
in Andhra Pradesh, no studies have analyzed the village debt burden in Sulthanpur. Comprised of 
343 households, residents of Sulthanpur rely almost entirely upon agriculture and agricultural 
labor to generate income. Of the landholding residents, 93% are small and marginal – owning 
less than two hectares of land. A significant portion of the population lives below the poverty 
line as well as is illiterate. These factors make it both a challenging and vital place to conduct a 
study on agrarian distress: as Gandhian development philosophy maintains, if development is to 
be sustainable, it must begin with the poorest and most marginalized communities.
8
  
In an effort to be true to this theoretical philosophy, this study involved a variety of 
methodological approaches, always aiming to hear the stories and perspectives of a number of 
community members.  In total, forty structured and semistructured interviews were conducted 
with farming families. While these interviews attempted to quantitatively analyze factors like 
input use, debt burden, etc, they always ended with open conversation with farmers about their 
experiences with agrarian livelihoods and distress. These forty interviews were comprised of 35 
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borewell owning farmers, as irrigation was a main focus of this study, but also five interviews 
with farmers who did not own borewells as a point of comparison. Though not perfect accurate, 
the pool of respondents was selected to be representative of local demographics, paying 
particular attention to caste, landholding, annual income, and gender. Three farming families 
were also selected for more in depth case studies. Further, interviews with farmers were 
supplemented with interviews with borewell drilling companies and operators, a money 
lender/middleman and seed/chemical shop owner, and bank manager. Further, a group discussion 
was conducted with a women’s village organization and direct observation methods were 
conducted at a local Gram Panchayat meeting. These methods were strategically chosen to 
provide a combination of qualitative and quantitative research, creating village level analysis and 
household level nuanced stories. 
B. Defining Farmer, Defining Debt:  
 In studies, reports, and government documents about agrarian distress in India, 
particularly those related to farmer suicide, “farmer” is defined by the government, and 
subsequently by many scholars and journalists, as the individual in a family who owns the land 
title. In India, this is most frequently the male head of the household.
 9
 While the individual with 
the land title is certainly a farmer, he or she is not the only farmer. All members of the farming 
household, including women and other family members, contribute vast amounts of labor and 
wisdom to the farming process. This study attempted to integrate their voices into the interview 
process for a more holistic understanding of farming livelihoods. Thus, throughout this paper, the 
term “farmer” is gender neutral – it can refer to female or male respondents.  
                                                          
9
 Uma Sudhir, “Women Farmers Who Commit Suicide Ignored by the State,” NDTV (Jan 2012). 
11 
 
 It is also important to clarify farmer terminology. While this study was primarily focused 
on farmers who own borewells and grow groundwater irrigated crops in the dry season in 
addition to rainfed crops in the rainy season, as a point of comparison, it did interview some 
farmers who are purely rainfed and only grow crops during the rainy season.  Despite the fact 
that both groups do practice rainfed agriculture, the difference is that borewell owning farmers 
do not only practice rainfed agriculture. This is an important distinction as the opportunity to 
grow two crops a year incentivizes farmer investment in borewell irrigation. While this 
terminology is far from perfect, in this paper these two groups will be referred to as “borewell 
owning farmers” and “rainfed farmers.” 
 As important as it is to define “farmer,” it is equally important to define and contextualize 
the concept of debt. Debt is not inherently corrosive to livelihoods. Farmers in Andhra Pradesh 
have been borrowing and repaying loans from banks and money lenders for many decades. 
However, in the past decade, due to rising inputs and rising expenditures, debt has become 
persistent, outstanding, and subsequently more severe for many farmers
10
. It is the persistent and 
outstanding debt that this study was interested in analyzing. Thus, when this paper discusses debt 
burden, it is concerned with debt that is both quantitatively large and takes years to repay. 
IV. Structural Framework: Neoliberal Economics and the Changing the Purpose of 
Agriculture 
In order to understand the significance of agrarian crisis and irrigation in rural Andhra 
Pradesh, it is important to consider the impacts of globalization and trade liberalization on Indian 
agricultural throughout the 1990s as much agrarian change is rooted in these processes. 
Liberalized agricultural policy is an important framework for both crises of productivity and 
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profitability.  Economic liberalization has not only allowed for the free import and export of 
commodities, but it has also allowed for the export and import of entire systems of production – 
in particular, the export of capital intensive, input intensive, and market oriented linear systems 
of output from developed countries and to developing countries.  
Pre economic liberalization in 1991 and agricultural trade liberalization in 1997, 
agricultural in India was largely subsistence based. Despite technological changes that occurred 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, such as state investments in public irrigation and the 
introduction of fertilizers – the production and consumption of food across rural spaces was 
primarily localized. Though portions of the country were beginning to produce food at higher 
output levels and on larger scales, a majority of small and marginal farmers still largely practiced 
a more subsistence based form of agriculture.
11
   
Further, even in states where production was being scaled up during the late 1960s and 
1970s, food production was still largely domestic as the Indian government, under Indira Gandhi, 
pursued national food self sufficiency. In order to achieve this goal, the government established a 
number of trade restrictions on crops. For example, in the case of rice, export and import ceilings 
and tariffs were established to encourage domestic production and consumption. Further, 
according to trade policy, rice had a minimum export price, also called a minimum support price, 
which amounted to 150% the cost of production. For those farmers who were producing for the 
market, these policies provided some institutionalized economic security.  
1992 through 1997 witnessed the dismantling of many of these policies. When India 
opened its economy in 1991, trade restrictions were somewhat relaxed, though not fully. After 
India became a WTO signatory in 1995, the WTO mandated the full liberalization of agricultural 
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trade. In 1996, India shattered its previous quota by exporting 2 million tons of rice, and in 1997, 
the government abolished minimum export prices, volume based restrictions on imports and 
exports, and tariffs were greatly reduced. This policy reform represented a “shift in institutional 




This shift in policy signifies a changing purpose for agriculture – instead of growing food 
to feed people, the purpose became to grow crops to generate cash. As the market came to 
dominate agroeconomic relationships, and rupees replaced calories as the primary measurement 
of production, agriculture began to show up in measurements of Andhra Pradesh and India’s 
GDNP.  Whereas food self sufficiency was of primary importance to the Indian government 
before 1991 – in the 1980s, India produced enough food for both domestic consumption and 
some export – economic growth became the goal of post-liberalization agricultural policy.
13
  
Further, these policies have also dramatically reoriented and restructured methods of 
production throughout India. This phenomenon is particularly visible in Sulthanpur. In general, 
localized food production has been replaced with market oriented food production, and cash 
became an intermediary in farming families between production and consumption. Although 
some farmers in Sulthanpur grow a little paddy for their families, most sell their crops and 
purchase their food entirely in the market. This is both the result and cause of the rising 
importance of cash crop agriculture and to reduction of crop diversity in the past fifteen years 
To be more specific, it was precisely in 1997 that farmers in Sulthanpur reported 
beginning to change their crop choices. In general, the trend among farmers was to simplify. 
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From the sample of borewell owning and rainfed farmers, 65% reported reducing the number of 
crops they grew and replacing many food items with cash crops. Previously, these farmers 
tended to grow a diversity of vegetables, grains, paddies, and millets for family consumption and 
local distribution. However, in the past fifteen years, crops like maize, paddy, cotton, and 
groundnut have come to dominate the landscape. Farmers sell these crops in the market to earn 
an income. They are also entirely dependent on the market for their day to day eating habits. 
Thus, changing national agricultural priorities have been imposed upon, and embedded in, the 
rural landscape. As the market has become the intended recipient of crops and the economy the 
intended beneficiary of production, food and human consumption are subordinated in India and 
Sulthanpur.    
V. Structural Framework: Changing Agricultural Systems  
Just as the purpose of agriculture has changed since 1997, so have methods of production. 
For example, in Sulthanpur, hybrid seeds have entirely replaced traditional, local varieties and 
chemical fertilizers have largely replaced natural compost. As a result, agriculture systems have 
become input intensive, linear, and market dependent. Post 1997, agricultural and chemical 
multinational corporations were given access to local markets and rural areas and landscapes 
were flooded with new varieties of hybrid seeds, agro chemicals, and technologies.  
While these technologies had certainly been present in Indian agricultural before 1997, 
having been introduced by the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, they suddenly proliferated 
and became widely available, even to the most marginal of farmers. Brands like Monsanto and 
Syngenta began showing up in little villages across the country – importing new systems of 
production and restructuring agroecologies. In essence, laboratory agriculture became the new 
15 
 
ecological logic.  Therefore, since the liberalization of agricultural trade in 1997, systems of food 
production have transformed. Not only did the emphasis of agriculture change – from growing 
food to growing crops for the market, inputs also changed. Hybrid seeds replaced traditional, 
local varieties and chemical fertilizers largely replaced natural compost. In general, production 
became input intensive, linear, and market dependent. 
This phenomenon is evident in Sulthanpur. All the farmers interviewed identified 1997 as 
the year when agricultural systems began to change in the village. Of the farmers surveyed, 
100% reported switching from local seed varieties and seed saving practices to using hybrid 
seeds and purchasing them in the market every season in the past fifteen years. 1997 also marks 
the years that the purchase and use of agrochemicals become widespread throughout the village. 
Suddenly, products from companies like Syngenta, BASF, and other multinational corporations 
began appearing in local shops and replacing older forms of soil enrichment, like natural 
compost.  
These systematic transformations have not been unintentional or entirely organic. In the 
past 15 years, local shops have relentlessly advertized hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides as 
miracle inputs that increasing fertility, productivity, and crop resilience. As one seed and 
fertilizer shop owner stated: “If farmers are cheap, their livelihoods will suffer. If they choose 
instead to buy the expensive, quality products, their livelihoods will improve.”
14
 A farmer 
affirmed this message when he stated: “If you but more expensive seeds, you will get higher 
yields.” He also commented that advertizing played an important role in his initial shift to hybrid 
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seeds as he was promised higher productivity and profit.
15
 He wasn’t alone in this transition. 
Multiple farmers reported originally choosing to purchase hybrid seeds and agrochemicals 
because of such advertizing, and even more farmers reported being influenced by other farmers 
who had made the decision to switch.  
Though in a more subtle manner, the government of Andhra Pradesh also actively 
promotes hybrid seeds and agrochemicals through a policy of subsidies – up to 25% off the 
market price. A number of other farmers reported initially switching to these technologies 
because they were promised higher yield and increased profit by the government.
16
 One farmer 
stated that he trusts the products that the government supports. However, he also reported that 
when he bought hybrid seeds, the government didn’t inform him that he wouldn’t be able to save 
them year after year. He was forced to purchase again the subsequent season when the seeds did 
not germinate, and since then, he has had to purchase hybrid seeds from the government or shops 
every season.  
17
 
Though this new system initially improved yields in Sulthanpur, throughout the past 
fifteen years it has also contributed to the crisis of productivity mentioned previously. As 
reported by farmers in Sulthanpur, originally, in the first year of implementation, hybrid seeds 
and chemical inputs increased farmer yields. As a 90% of farmers in Sulthanpur are small and 
marginal, those interviewed felt that if they were going to sell their crops in the market, it was 
important to maximize yield on their small landholdings. However, for those farmers who 
implemented hybrid and chemical technologies earlier, between 15-10 years ago, many have 
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found it difficult to maintain the same levels of productivity since those initial spikes. Farmers 
have had to continuously increase their inputs year after year to achieve the same results. In 
Sulthanpur, farmers reported increasing their chemical usage by 200% - 600% in an attempt to 
stabilize yields. 
It is important to note that many farmers reported to declining soil fertility as an 
important contributor to these declining yields. As  Narasimha Rao and K. C. Suri state in their 
article, “Dimensions of Agrarian Distress in Andhra Pradesh,” 
“High use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers year after year has had a deleterious 
effect on the productivity of the soil and environment.
18
 One farmer confirmed this when 
he said that his fields have “become adjusted to fertilizer,” and so he has to increase his 
quantity of input annually in order to stabilize falling yields.”
19
  
 Other scholars argue that while the trend of continuously increasing inputs is the result of 
changing soil fertility, it is also partly psychological. As B.N. Ghosh argued in her article 
“Globalization and Food Policy Dilemmas in Developing Countries: Contextualizing the Indian 
Scenario”,  
“Farmers are led by the traders of seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, who of late have 
become the main source of knowledge and information to the farmers on cultivation 
practices, to believe that they need to use more of these inputs to reap a better harvest.”  
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Farmers in Sulthanpur confirmed this sentiment when they stated they believed that the more 
fertilizer they use, the better their harvest will be. The solution to declining yields is simply more 
chemicals.  
To compound matters, in the past fifteen years many farmers surveyed mentioned that 
they have had to sell off their livestock to repay debt. This phenomenon further pushed farmers 
toward agrochemicals and solidified the transition to input intensive production systems.
20
  
While many believed that compost was both better for the soil and their crops, their lack of 
access to livestock prevented them from returning to compost fertilizer. In general, there is 
minimal compost usage in Sulthanpur, and the farmers who do use compost tend to be large, 
wealthier farmers who have not had to liquidate their assets and sell their livestock.  
Despite numerous accounts of runaway chemical use and declining yields, few policy 
makers and private market players seem to be questioning the appropriateness of these 
technologies on farmers and their livelihoods. However, the stories from farmers in Sulthanpur 
reporting the need to increase their chemical usage yearly in order to compensate for declining 
soil fertility and yield certainly challenges the wisdom of conventional, input intensive systems 
of production. As individuals who have a wealth of agricultural wisdom built up over 
generations, farmers’ knowledge of local agroecology is both intimate and holistic. Policy 
makers and scientists would do well to incorporate farmer’s wisdom into their agricultural 
developments.  
VI. Water: The Annual Wildcard 
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While relationships between chemical use, soil fertility, and yield are certainly linked, the 
key variable, or wildcard, in the productivity equation is water. Andhra Pradesh is a semi-arid 
state where 57.7% of agricultural land is irrigated with rainwater. However, monsoon patterns 
have begun to change, placing purely rainfed farmers in a precarious position. Of the farmers 
interviewed, all mentioned a shortage of rainfall in recent years. According to two farmers, while 
some years are better than others for rainfall, in their memory, no year has reached average 
rainfall in the past decade.
21
 According to another farmer, during the four month rainy season, 
they currently get as much rainfall as they used to get in two months a decade ago. 
22
 However, 
the problem isn’t simply about quantity – it is also about timing and regularity. According to one 
farmer, the monsoons are starting later and later each year, and the duration of time between 
rainfall events is increasing. 
23
 Further, climactic extremes are impacting crop productivity – 
particularly in the past three years. All farmers interviewed reported flooding and crop failure in 
2010, and then severe drought and crop failure in 2011.  
Increasing inputs and decreasing rainfall security have led to a crisis of productivity 
throughout AP, but particularly in Sulthanpur.  Some farmers reported yields declining by as 
much as 50 - 70% in the past ten to fifteen years,
24
 while others reported years of total crop 
failure.
25
 While there are a few farmers whose experiences differ, this is the reality that a 
majority of farmers are experiencing. The impacts of declining yields and productivity are felt 
most acutely by small and marginal farmers who have minimal land under cultivation to begin 
with.  
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Declining yields and uncertain rainfall patterns are pushing farmers toward other methods 
of irritation. In Andhra Pradesh, in the past decade, the percentage of rain and canal fed land has 
decreased by 5% annually, while the percentage of groundwater irrigated land has similarly 
increased.
26
 In Sulthanpur, where there are no public irrigation facilities or surface water sources, 
this phenomenon is even more dramatic: wherein 85% of borewells have been drilled in the past 
decade, and 96% have been drilled in the past two decades.  This timeline maps clearly onto 
farmer’s reports of rainfall change, and as many farmers reported themselves, there is a direct 
correlation between inadequate rainfall, declining yields, and investment in borewells. As the 
owner of one local borewell drilling company stated: “Water scarcity drives farmers to my 
company. As long as rain is a problem, I will have business.”
27
 
VII. Case Study 1  
That statement was certainly true for Bayya Venkataiah and his wife Bayya Ashamella, 
who, after severe drought in 2011, decided to drill a borewell in hopes of buffering their income 
against rainfall and climate variations. While soil fertility and yield had been declining for a 
number of years, and Venkataiah and Ashamella had been forced to constantly increase fertilizer 
use on their fields in an attempt to stabilize production, their yield declined dramatically after 
severe and untimely monsoons flooded their fields in 2010, and drought struck in 2011, both of 
which nearly destroyed their yields two years in a row. In the wake of those experiences, 
Venkataiah and Ashamella decided to invest in a borewell in 2011.  
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 Like some other small and marginal farmers in Sulthanpur, Venakataiah and Ashamella 
did not have access to bank credit – given the state bank of Hyderabad’s policy of “preferential 
treatment for older customers,” as stated by the local branch’s bank manager, they had always 
relied upon money lenders and informal sources to finance their annual crop loan for 
agrochemicals and seeds. 
28
 When it came time to drill a borewell, they felt they had no choice to 
take another loan from their money lender. In Sulthanpur, the interest rate on loans from money 
lenders ranges from anywhere between 3-6 times the average bank loan interest rate. In the case 
of Venkataiah and Ashamella, the interest rate on their borewell was 3% per month, or, 36% per 
year.  
 Given the high interst rate and the fact that the price of a borewell is determined by its 
depth – the groundwater table in Sulthanpur last year hovered near 500 ft – the borewell became 
a very significant financial investment for the family, especially given its interest rate. While the 
principle totaled over two times their annual income, after accumulating six months of interest, 
the loan amounted to two and a half times their annual income. When added to previously unpaid 
crop loans, the couple is facing a total debt burden that is nearly seven times their annual income. 
 In the past six months, the water in the borewell has declined by 50%. This season 
Venkataiah and Anjamma didn’t even have enough water to irrigate a whole acre of paddy. After 
the third year in a row of poor yields, they have little income to spare. After they pay what little 
they can on their loans, there is no money left over for household expenditures, like their 
electricity bill and food. The couple recently had to take out another loan just to cover these basic 
needs.  
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 To compound matters, in exchange for the loan, after harvest Venkataiah and Anjamma 
are required to sell their crop back to the money lender, who serves as a middleman between 
them and the market. On average, middle men offer lower prices for crops as well as exact 
interest for seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs that they loaned out at the beginning of the season. 
Profit is further depressed for the couple who badly needs  
 When asked what the couple was planning to do next season, they said that they didn’t 
know – it depended upon the water. Assuming that they would be able to get another loan to 
cover the upfront costs of production, they hoped that favorable rains and a steady groundwater 
table would allow them to have a higher and more profitable harvest. Their hopes were modest – 
to be able to cover their household needs with their own income and pay off a little debt.  
VIII. Connecting  Productivity and Profitability: Groundwater Concerns 
 As seen in the story of Venkataiah and Ashamella, a crisis in productivity can quickly 
become a crisis in profitability. Though the search for water serves as a bridge between the two, 
there are a number of factors – natural, and constructed – that influence how well farmers are 
able to do each year. In the case of Sulthanpur, investments in borewells along with dramatically 
declining groundwater tables and high expenditures in the form of irrigation, electricity, 
chemicals, and seeds force capital intensive farming upon a farming class that is predominantly 
small, marginal, and poor. Further, this economic burden is compounded by the strong presence 
of informal finance in Sulthanpur and surrounding areas, which, in functioning as money lender 
on the production end of the system and middle man on the market end of the system, charge 
higher prices and higher interest rates for inputs and loans as well as provide lower market rates 
for crops. Therefore, while investment in borewells is central to the profitability crisis for many 
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farmers, there are a wide variety of factors need to be analyzed in turn in order to understand the 
complex web of finance, technology, and nature that farmers must negotiate on a regular basis.  
While many farmers see groundwater as a more secure source of irrigation than rainwater 
and subsequently look to borewell technology to compensate for their climatic vulnerability, 
groundwater irrigation is quickly proving itself to be uncertain and unsustainable. In Andhra 
Pradesh, 43.3% of agricultural land is irrigated with groundwater. This figure has increased 
roughly by 5% every year in the past decade while the percentage of rain and canal fed farmland 
has similarly decreased.
29
 Further, throughout the state groundwater table is as low as 300-400 ft, 
and in some areas even dips to 1000ft. The mining of groundwater to these levels has contributed 
to the drying up of ponds, rivers, streams, and other surface water sources. 
30
 While the drying of 
surface water has important implications for irrigation, it also affects larger issues of livelihood. 
According to one farmer in Sulthanpur, the drying of a local pond has eliminated a main source 
of drinking water for local cattle. Some cattle have died, others have been sold, and farmers have 
had to find new drinking water sources for the rest.
31
 Some farmers have been forced to divert 
water from their borewells for their cattle. 
32
 
 In accordance with trends throughout the state, groundwater levels in Sulthanpur have 
decreased dramatically in the past ten years. According to two separate borewell operators, 10 
years ago they would first strike water at 60ft, and by drilling to 100ft would find plenty of water 
for the farmer. This year, operators reported drilling 530 ft. deep before they struck water, and 
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borewell depth is ranging from 600-700 ft deep in total.
33
 This represents a nearly 900% decrease 
in the groundwater level. Further, statistically, drilling companies are finding that for every five 
borewells they drill, only one strikes water. The other four fail completely, signifying that the 
groundwater table in some areas is even lower than 700ft.  
 In interviews, farmers affirmed this phenomenon. All but one farmer reported water 
tables declining between 50-80% (depending upon the borewells age and depth). Eight farmers 
reported their borewells failing entirely and being forced to return to purely rainfed agriculture. 
Additionally, a number of farmers reported successive borewell failures. Last year, driven by 
declining yields and insecure water supply, one farmer drilled five borewells on his land in one 
month, all of which failed. For each borewell that turned out to be dry, he became more 
desperate to drill a successful borewell in order to hopefully boost his yield and recover some of 
his investment. Previously, his family had minimal debt, but after drilling five unsuccessful 
borewells, he was left with a debt of Rs. 120,000 with a 36% annual interest rate.
34
 This wasn’t 
even the extreme -- another farmer reported drilling fifteen borewells with his brother in the span 
of twelve years– all ended up failing from the beginning or drying within a year or two.
35
  
Contributing to the high rate of borewell failure is the lack of strict regulation of drilling. 
Though the government of Andhra Pradesh implemented the Water, Land, and Trees Act in 
2004, which required borewells funded by state banks to be certified by a geologist before 
drilling, this act has done little to slow the rate of groundwater mining. According to Rule 12 of 
this act, “The Mandal Authority shall have to ensure that every owner of the well in his 
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jurisdiction, registers his well with the Mandal Authority, and obtains permission for new wells 
on payment of fee.”
36
 However, this process only applies to borewells which are funded by state 
banks, and involves a complex weighing of short term expenses and long term benefits.  
If a farmer obtains a bank loan for a borewell – which was a rare occurance in Sulthanpur 
due to a number of bureaucratic and procedural policies – a governmental geologist then surveys 
the farmer’s land. If the geologist inadequate groundwater, he advises the farmer not to drill. If 
he finds adequate water, he approves the borewell and registers it with the Mandal. Further, 
according to the act, if the geologist approves drilling and the borewell fails, the farmer can be 
compensated for his investment by the government.  
While this policy provides a safety net for those with access to bank credit, it also levies 
the cost of the certification upon the farmer – typically Rs 2,000 – which is in addition to, and 
cannot be covered by, the bank loan.  This additional expense is generally too expensive for most 
farmers and prevents them from seeking certification. According to the owner of a local borewell 
drilling company, only 5% of farmers – the wealthiest 5% of farmers – obtain certification for 
their borewell and drill according to the Water, Land, and Trees Act. The other 95% are forced to 
rely upon money lenders and informal finance as their primary source of credit. These informally 
financed borewells are termed “private” and outside of the jurisdiction of this act. The farmer 
does not have to get his or her land surveyed by a geologist or register his or her borewell 
certified. Similarly, companies do not need to register the borewell or their drilling with the 
government.  
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This policy framework leaves groundwater largely unregulated and opens up aquifers to 
mining. The fact that groundwater tables have decreased by over 900% in ten years is a glaring 
indicator that extraction is occurring at a significantly higher rate than recharge. Thus, borewell 
irrigation, in this context, has proven itself as unsustainable. Even the owner of a borewell 
drilling company acknowledged this fact. He stated that though he thinks business in Sulthanpur 
and surrounding areas will continue for the next five years, he doesn’t see drilling as particularly 
profitable in this region and is hoping to relocate his business in South Africa after that.
37
 
A. Borewells and Farmer Debt 
 Investments in borewell irrigation accompanied by falling groundwater levels and failing 
borewells have greatly impacted farmer debt and livelihood – particularly for small, marginal, 
and poor farmers. While the principle amount for a single borewell used to not be particularly 
outstanding, current rates have skyrocketed as depths have plummeted. Further, the issue for 
many farmers is not that the size of the loan necessarily, but rather the addition of any loan to 
their already tight income. With the exception of a few wealthy, large landholding farmers, all 
borewell farmers reported that though borewells might have initially improved their yields, over 
a number of years yields decreased, income decreased, and debt increased as yields were not 
compensating for the initial investment. Though farmers began taking loans out when they 
adopted hybrid seeds and agrochemicals, they reported “feeling indebted,” or feeling like they 
had a significant debt burden, the year they drilled their borewell.  As one farmer stated, 
“Borewells have not just increased debt, they have created debt. People without borewells don’t 
have debt.”  
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While this statement is not entirely factual – purely rainfed farmers also frequently take 
out crop loans for seeds and chemicals – the sentiment behind it is powerful. In comparison to 
purely rainfed farmers, borewell owners have a significantly more difficult time repaying their 
loans on time. Of the sample of purely rainfed farmers that were interviewed, all farmers 
reported borrowing, but they all also reported being able to repay their loans annually or every 
other year (with the exception of the past two years because of extreme weather conditions).
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Borewell owners, on the other hand, reported longer repayment schedules. Some stated that the 
additional borewell loan made it difficult to repay their annual crop loan – which is necessary for 
continued production, others stated that it took them between five-10 years to repay their 
borewell loan, while others reported either not fully paying it off or paying none of it off. This 
longer timetable for repayment is significant in that it contributes to the phenomenon that it 
proves. While extended repayment is evidence that borewell loans are creating economic 
burdens for farmers, it also contributes to the problem in that with  loans, time is equivalent to 
accumulating interest. As a majority of borewell loans are taken from money lenders who charge 
interest rates of 24% - 72% annually in Sulthanpur, a ten year repayment process can accumulate 
immense amounts of interest, which further exacerbate farmers inability to pay. As a result of 
this process, one farmer reported debt increasing by 600% since drilling their borewell.
39
  
 In summary, the relationship between groundwater irrigation and farmer debt is a 
multifaceted issue in which technology, policy, markets, and nature all interact. As farmers have 
sought groundwater irrigation to buffer against changing rainfall patterns, they have also taken 
out large investments at high interest rates for a technology that is, in this context, risky and 
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unsustainable. Further, as farmers in masse participate in this process, groundwater is being 
mined in the area and groundwater tables are declining dramatically, making the benefits of the 
investment obscelete to local farmers. Therefore, borewell irrigation is playing a central role in 
the dual crises occurring in Sulthanpur as it bridges issues of productivity with issues of 
profitability.  The story of borewell irrigation also hints at other components of the crisis of 
profitability – primarily the role of the informal market and informal finance in agricultural 
production and irrigation.  
One farmer, Chakali Anjaiah, whose borewell failed this year, repeatedly stated during 
her interview that this borewell failure had put her family under severe distress. For a family who 
lives season to season, the loss of a harvest can be detrimental to their income. Having taken out 
a crop loan for seeds and chemicals for the summer season, and then not been able to irrigate or 
cultivate, they face a compounded debt and no source of income. In preparation for the end of 
the season when she is expected to start paying loans, she disconnected her family’s electricity 
and began rationing their food.
40
  Once again, this story is not unique. As borewells have dried, 
particularly in the last few years, the area in Sulthanpur under groundwater irrigation has shrunk 
and many farmers reported having to leave acres fallow during the summer season.  
IX. Compounding Factors: Informal Finance  
 Money lenders and middle men – frequently one in the same, play an important role in 
determining profitability at the end of the season. As mentioned previously, farmers in 
Sulthanpur borrow annually for the seeds, chemicals, and other inputs required for production. 
While many depend upon informal finance, most would prefer to borrow from the bank because 
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of lower interest rates. However, a significant number of famrers do not have access to bank 
credit, forcing them to turn to informal sources of finance – primarily money lenders. From the 
sample of farmers in Sulthanpur, farmers without access to bank credit tend to be predominantly 
small, marginal, and poor, but are prevented from accessing bank credit due to a number of 
bureaucratic and logistical factors.  
Access to bank credit is both a matter of policy and sheer numbers. If a farmer has a 
preexisting relationship with the bank, in the case of Sulthanpur, the State Bank of Hyderabad, 
than they are able to annually utilize formal financial institutions to secure their crop loans. 
However, the percentage of farmers with preexisting credit is signifianctly smaller than the 
number of farmers seeking credit. As, banks in rural areas are organized regionally, and farmers 
must take a crop loan from a bank that serves their region, the period of time right before 
cropping season can be entirely hectic. As the bank manager for SBH stated – it is impossible for 
banks to serve all farmers in a locality because of their lack of personnel and resources. As he 
described, fifteen days before the start of the season, somewhere between 2,000 – 3,000 farmers 
from a number of villages descend upon the bank seeking loans. The single field officer whose 
job it is to approve the loans cannot possible process serve all these people. Therefore, the bank 
has adopted a policy of preferential treatment for preexisting customers. The privileged farmers 
with bank credit are continuously served while those without access are never able to make the 
transition between informal and formal finance.  
This proves problematic as informal finance tends to control multiple aspects of 
production and profit – the job of seed and agrochemical seller overlaps with that of money 
lender and mediator, in charge of loaning money, exacting interest, and serving as an 
intermediary between the farmer and the market. For example, at the beginning of a season, a 
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farmer, with no cash to spare, takes seeds and chemicals on loan from a local shop. In exchange 
for loaning out bulk products, the shop then imposes an interest rate – anywhere between 3-6 
times that of the bank interest rate – and requires the farmer to sell their crops back to him after 
harvest to ensure repayment. The interest is then exacted, and farmers are paid for their crops. 
However, according to the majority of farmers who are subjected to this cycle, not only does 
interest affect their profit, money lenders tend to buy at prices that are lower than those in the 
market. A number of farmers reported that money lenders are purchasing crops at half the market 
rate, and then turning around and selling them for twice the profit the farmer made. Farmers had 
strong opinions about this process. As one farmer stated, “Money lenders make twice the money 
in one day that a farmer makes throughout an entire season.”
41
 Responding to the work and profit 
discrepancies between money lenders and farmers, another individual commented that “the poor 
will be poor and the rich will be rich in agriculture.”
42
 And still another stated, “The farmer is the 
backbone of the country. If the market rate was fair, the farmer would live a luxurious life.”
43
 
While this situation is far from fair, a majority of small and marginal farmers in 
Sulthanpur have no choice but to participate as they don’t have the upfront cash to pay directly 
for inputs at the beginning of the season. Further, this dependence upon money lenders is likely 
exacerbated in Sulthanpur. In India, 48% of farmers purchase seeds, in AP, 81% purchase seeds, 
but of the farmers surveyed in Sulthanpur, 100% purchased seeds. Of these farmers, only three 
stated that bank credit allowed them to avoid borrowing inputs from local shops. The rest 
reported a dependence upon local shops for their inputs. According to the owner of one such 
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shop, 99% of farmers who borrow from him do not have the cash to pay upfront. Agreeing to sell 
their crops back to the shop at the end of the season, they instead take their inputs on loan.  
Further, seed and fertilizer prices have risen dramatically throughout India, including in  
local Sulthanpur markets. As XXXX describes, “Fertilizer subsidy [in India] has been 
considerably reduced. Fertilizer subsidy, which amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP and 6 percent of 
the Union revenue expenditure in 1990-91, was reduced to to 2.5 percent and 5 percent by 1997-
98. It was further reduced to .69 percent of GDP by 2003-2004.” Farmers in sulthanpur have 
intimately felt the economic impacts of the withdrawal of state support. While nearly all farmers 
reported increasing seed and fertilizer prices in the past fifteen years, one farmer quantified these 
increases. He stated that in the past ten years, the price of seeds has increased by 30%, the price 
of Urea has also increased by 30%, and the price of DAP has increased by 100%. 
44
 These rising 
expenditures further exacerbate the crisis of profitability as they squeeze farmers’ incomes and 
force them to take out larger loans to cover the upfront costs of expenditures and frequently 
increase their dependence upon money lenders and informal sources of finance.   
A. Case Study 2 
 While a majority of surveyed farmers were engaged in this cycle of increasing 
expenditures and reliance upon money lenders, and middle men, the impacts of this dynamic in 
the village can be best expressed through the story of one farmer who acutely experienced the 
consequences of reliance upon informal finance.   
 Karukonda Ramulu is a farmer with a long legacy in Sulthanpur. His ancestors have 
farmed in the village for many generations, “forever,” as he stated, growing rainfed jowar, 
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vegetables, and other cereals. However when he and five other farmers received a government 
grant to drill a collective borewell twenty years ago as a part of a public initiative to support 
impoverished, scheduled caste farmers, he simplified his crop choice to rainfed jowar and 
irrigated paddy. Eventually, as the communal borewell began to dry and farmers began to fight 
over water usage, Ramulu decided to invest in a personal borewell. Having never had access to 
bank credit, Ramulu took out a loan from the same shop that he borrowed his seeds and 
chemicals from annually. The money lender established an interest rate of 3% per month, and 
told Ramulu the total was due six months after the start of cultivation.  
 While the water in the borewell was low to begin with, it only took six months for it to 
dry up completely. Therefore, after one season of paddy cultivation, Ramulu was forced to leave 
his lands fallow during the summer season and rely entirely upon rainfed jowar. However, 
Ramulu is required to sell back his jowar to the same money lender, who after exacting interest, 
pays Ramulu a price that is 40% of the market rate. Desperate for income, he has no choice but 
to accept.  
 Further, the money lender is not happy that Ramulu has still not paid off his borewell 
loan, and is threatening to not loan seeds and chemicals to him next season if he doesn’t pay 
immediately. Lacking the cash to repay the loan, Ramulu feels that he is potentially facing a year 
of no harvest. He would seek out another money lender, but this money lender’s pressurizing 
tactics prevent him from doing so. Ramulu stated that he feels sorrow and worry when he thinks 
about the future, and does not know what he is going to do to either pay back the borewell loan 
or borrow the seeds and chemicals he needs for cultivation.  
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 The term Ramulu uses to describe the money lender is Shavkar, which among locals 
means “feudal lord.” As the money lender controls all aspects of Ramulu’s production – inputs 
and outputs, prices and profit – his terminology is not inappropriate. Though not all farmers in 
Sulthanpur are facing the same situation, many are engaged in similar systems of agriculture.  
Therefore, just as the crisis of productivity in sulthanpur is the result of input intensive chemical 
farming and its high water demands, so too is the crisis of profitability constructed according to 
hierarchies or power and class.  
X. Further Manifestations: The Extent of Distress  
As outlined above, increasing expenditures, decreasing profitability, a reliance upon 
informal finance, and the presence of persistent and outstanding debt have put a significant 
strain on farmers’ livelihoods and day to day existence. With the exception of wealthy and large 
landholding farmers, all reported feeling that it was very difficult for them to repay their loans. 
Further, all but one farmer reported that agriculture had become significantly less profitable 
during their lifetime. These factors have manifested themselves in farmer’s lives and the local 
economy in a number of ways. Out of the farmers surveyed, which were diversified according 
to caste, income, age, gender, and landholding, all but two reported either not being able to pay 
back their loans on time or not repay them at all. This phenomenon generally began the year 
they drilled the borewell – previously, many commented that they were able to repay their loans 
annually or according to the predetermined repayment schedule. Similarly, of the rainfed 
farmers who were interviewed, all reported being able to repay more regularly than a majority 
of borewell owning farmers.  
Further, this extra debt burden affected the rest of the household economy for borewell 
owning farmers. A number of farmers reported that after they paid a little bit on their loans 
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every month, they hardly had enough money to cover their household expenses, like food and 
electricity. Some had discontinued their electricity connection and begun to ration food for their 
family – eating two meals a day instead of three. Similarly, other farmers reported having to 
take out loans to cover their household expenses. One farmer stated that though the loan 
temporarily covered their daily expenditures, she wasn’t sure how she would be able to repay 
the loan or put food on the table once the loan had run out.  
Some farmers compensated for this dilemma by borrowing to repay loans. Taking a loan 
from one money lender, they would borrow another from a different money lender to repay the 
first. Then, they would take out another from the first to repay the second. While this method 
served to relieve pressure that families felt from money lenders, they also stated that it put them 
in a precarious position economically as the interest accumulated and they were forced to 
borrow larger and larger loans each time.  
These stories are not even the most extreme. While farmer suicide is rare in Sulthanpur, it 
is not unheard of. One farmer, who had been identified as a respondent for this study, took his 
life the night before his interview. This tragedy was felt throughout the village as the 
community was forced to face the grim reality of agrarian distress.   
His story, as well as the stories of other farmers facing debt and distress, bridges the 
personal and political as it reveals the impacts of a joint system of unsustainable agriculture and 
unsustainable economics. While farmers are trying their best to earn a living in this complicated 
system, their livelihoods, particularly for the vast majority of farmers who are small, marginal, 
and poor, are severely impacted. With little state support and no voice in policy, the lives of the 
rural poor are sacrificed in the name of neoliberal economics and economic growth. Their 
stories are both a call for grassroots development policy and investment in rural areas. While 
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many farmers are certainly looking for more immediate forms of relief than those generated by 
policy, we must prioritize the rural poor as we generate development policy. However, as we 
look ahead to a future of continued globalization and neoliberal economics, this is not the case.  
 
XI. Summary of Findings 
As outlined above, the intensification of agriculture since the Green Revolution in 
Andhra Pradesh has placed small and marginal farmer livelihoods in an uncertain and vulnerable 
position. This linear version of agriculture, which relies upon significant inputs and financial 
investments to produce a single cash crop for the market, has created a cyclical burden for 
farmers where they are constantly borrowing and investing in more chemicals and deeper wells 
in order to compensate for declining yields. The liberalization of agricultural trade in 1997 has 
exacerbated this vulnerability as farmers are no longer able to fetch a high enough price in the 
market to repay their debt. Though the Green Revolution and economic liberalization were 
touted as development progress in the agricultural sector, the state is facing crises of productivity 
and profitability as a result of them.  
XII. Looking Ahead: Policy Limitations 
Though the state of Andhra Pradesh has attempted to compensate for agrarian crisis – 
mainly in the form of financial relief to families of farmer suicide – the root issue of a linear, 
market oriented production system that has been imposed upon inappropriate landscapes and 
populations – have not been addressed. This is partly due to the fact that Andhra Pradesh’s long 
term development strategy does not look to small and marginal farmers to revive rural areas.   
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In “Vision 2020,” Andhra Pradesh’s twenty year development plan, the government 
points toward industrial agriculture as an engine for economic growth and rural employment. 
“Vision 2020” states: “ Andhra Pradesh can capitalize on its agricultural advantages to further 
develop its agro-industries using raw materials such as cotton, sugar, tobacco, chillies, etc. 
Furthermore, agro-industry can create considerable economic impact through value addition, 
higher export earnings, and high employment, especially in rural areas.”
45
 Thus, while the 
government has certainly acknowledged small and marginal farmer crisis in the state, it is 
looking toward industry as a way to revive and develop the rural areas. Contract farming, where 
the state leases land to private companies who are responsible for all the stages of production, 
marketing, and export, is also being discussed and implemented in the state as a similar 
development strategy.  
In this way, Vision 2020 sheds a complicated light on the agrarian crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh in that though agricultural crisis is acknowledged as a problem, it is simultaneously 
paving the way for the state’s preferred form of future development. Farmer suicide, rural to 
urban migration, and debt are clearing rural areas of small and marginal farmers. Of the small 
and marginal farmers surveyed in Sulthanpur, all stated that they don’t want their children or 
grandchildren to be farmers. Further, many are starting to pick up wage labor jobs to either 
supplement their income or help them transition out of agriculture. 
46
 As villages empty, farmer 
indebtedness is paving the way for the future consolidation of land under large farmers, 
agroindustry, and private companies. Therefore, industry, as well as the state whose economy is 
driven by industry, becomes an indirect beneficiary of agrarian crisis, farmer debt, and farmer 
suicide.  
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XIII. Alternative ways forward: Democratizing Technology and Food Production 
This pro growth and pro industry plan raises the question of what will happen to villages 
like Sulthanpur if alternative forms of rural revival and sustainable development are not pursued 
by organizations, local governments, and individuals. Grassroots mobilization and social 
agitation are necessary in order to regain livelihood security throughout rural Andhra Pradesh. In 
Sulthanpur, with the assistance of WASSAN, farmers are beginning to consider forming a 
watershed committee in order to develop a communally owned and managed irrigation project to 
compensate for changing rainfall patterns and groundwater decline.  At the gram panchayat 
meeting where this initiative was proposed, farmers were incredibly eager to get started. Instead 
of asking – “should we do this?” – farmers were asking, “when can we start?”.   
Watershed initiatives are vital to increasing the sustainability of agriculture and security 
of livelihoods as borewell related debt is central to agrarian distress in Sulthanpur. However, 
efforts must be broader than water. Other expenditures, like those for seeds and chemicals, figure 
prominently into the debt equation as they perpetuate dependence upon the market and upon 
borrowing. Future initiatives must challenge all these factors as well as the entire logic of input 
intensive, market oriented conventional agriculture, especially in the context of small and 
marginal farmers. A return to closed loop agricultural systems would boost productivity and 
sustainability as well as ease the stress of inputs on farmer finances.  
 
XIV. Recommendations for Future Scholarship 
 As mentioned previously, studies of agrarian distress in Andhra Pradesh have been fairly 
focused on farmer suicide and other extreme manifestations of crisis. Past studies have been 
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concentrated in hot spots of suicide, focusing predominately on only two or three districts in the 
state. This research bias is both geographic and social as it seeks the most dramatic stories and 
localities. In doing so, it leaves a majority of rural areas and people unstudied. Future studies of 
agrarian distress must make an effort to compensate for these research gaps, acknowledging that 
governments, organizations, and academics will never fully understand the dynamics and extent 
of distress unless research is more diversified, holistic, and thorough.  
 Similarly, greater focus needs to be placed upon varying distress burdens according to 
caste, class, and gender. While this subject was not the focus of this study, it became apparent 
throughout the research process that these social factors mediate and sometimes exacerbate 
individuals’ and families’ experience of debt. Distress is not a blanket phenomenon – future 
studies that examine different burdens across caste, class, and gender lines will go far to help 
nuance current understandings of the rural experience.  
 Finally, future efforts in rural Andhra Pradesh and throughout India must seek to combine 
research with activism in order to bridge the gaps between scholarship and livelihoods, 
discussion and action, and sustainable development theory and practice. After countless 
interviews with farmers who demanded to know how this study was going to help them repay 
their debt or provide their families with food, it became apparent that scholarship on its own is 
not enough. While further studies are vital to understanding rural distress, local governments, 
organizations, scholars, and people must also focus on activism and grassroots social change in 
order to challenge existing livelihood systems and create better ones. If we hope to find a more 
sustainable, secure agrarian future, we must harness the passion of these farmers, learn to revalue 
local knowledge and tradition, begin to reinvest in rural landscapes, and challenge the idea that 
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